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2Determinants of Voluntary Accounting Policy
Choices by Australian Life Insurers
ABSTRACT
This paper empirically examines various incentives facing managers of Australian life
insurers to voluntarily use actuarial-based income smoothing techniques (AIS). AIS
were subsequently incorporated into jointly-developed Australian and New Zealand
life insurance accounting standards (LIAS) issued in 1997. The propensity of
managers to voluntarily use AIS is predicted to be related to the firm’s tax rate,
ownership structure, size, expense ratio and solvency. These predictions were tested
on a sample of 28 firms during the period 1992-93. Empirical results suggest that
firms using AIS tend to be larger, pay higher levels of income tax and are less likely to
contravene minimum solvency requirements.
Key words:         Actuarial income-smoothing techniques, life insurance
Data availability: The data used in this study is based on publicly available sources.
3Introduction
Reporting life insurance profitability is complex due to the uncertainty
surrounding the term of policies written. Historically, UK life insurance companies
have prepared financial reports mainly to meet government solvency-based
requirements. However following increasing product competition from other financial
service providers and take-over activities during the late 1980s, UK actuaries, with
specialised professional skills in the financial management of these businesses,
developed various actuarial income-smoothing techniques (AIS) in order to provide
shareholders with a more ‘realistic’ picture of the business (Horton and Macve, 1995).
AIS uses present-value techniques to determine long-term life insurance business
profitability for inclusion in financial reports produced on a ‘smoothed’ economic
earnings basis. However AIS has been criticised in both the academic literature and
financial press for not meeting either statutory-based solvency rules, or providing a
‘true and fair view’ (O’Brien, 1995). These issues have also attracted the attention of
accounting rule-makers: recently the International Accounting Standards Committee
commenced a project on this issue.
In recent years, the Australian actuarial profession has closely followed these
UK developments. In 1991 the Australian actuarial profession developed a particular
type of AIS known as the ‘Margin on Services’ (or ‘MOS’) method of valuing policy
liabilities. This type of AIS measures the present value of future receipts from and
payments to policyholders, plus planned margins of revenues over expenses related to
services yet to be provided to policyholders. AIS were subsequently incorporated into
proposed life insurance accounting standards jointly promulgated by Australian and
4New Zealand accounting standard bodies as an exposure draft in July 1996. This paper
examines why managers of certain Australian life insurance firms faced incentives to
voluntarily use AIS shortly after it was developed (1992-93).
Due to the complexity and uncertainties surrounding life insurance business,
life insurers face relatively high levels of information asymmetry in their relationships
with customers and shareholders (Ross, 1989). Bartov and Bodnar (1996) (hereinafter
“B&B”) show that an information asymmetry perspective provides a rationale for
explaining accounting choice. This perspective suggests that, ceteris paribus, value-
maximising managers have incentives to choose more informative accounting
techniques (such as AIS) to reduce the degree of information asymmetry among
capital market participants. B&B posit that firms with greater information asymmetry
are more likely to switch to more informative accounting methods when they become
available. They find support for these predictions on the choice of functional currency
among a sample of 788 U.S. multinational firms reporting cumulative translation
adjustments on their balance sheets in the fiscal year 1982/1983. However B&B
caution against too wide an interpretation of their results, and call for ‘future research
to develop methods and identify settings which allow further examination of the
information asymmetry perspective and other theories of accounting research’ (B&B,
416).
Further evidence on the information asymmetry perspective is warranted for a
number of reasons. First, B&B acknowledge that information asymmetry is not a well
defined concept and examine a number of alternative indirect empirical proxies.
Second, in studying the choice of foreign currency by US firms, B&B rely on prior
research which defines information asymmetry in terms of a demand for liquidity by
capital market participants (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). While this accounting
5choice may help to reduce information asymmetry among market participants about
the impact of exchange rates on firm performance, it is not directly value-relevant to
their assessment of a firm’s underlying cash flows. By contrast, Chaney and Lewis
(1995) define information asymmetry in terms of the inability of investors to observe
economic earnings from reported accounting earnings. They show that a manager of a
high-value firm, realising that investors place higher value on firms who they expect
to maintain economic earnings in the future, over-reports income relative to the first-
best tax minimising reporting policy by using accounting policies which ‘smooth’
their earnings. Third, prior research has not examined information asymmetry in
explaining intra-industry accounting policy choices, such as in life insurance, where
monitoring, bonding and control costs are severe.1
The findings presented in this paper suggest that, consistent with the
information asymmetry perspective, reported tax rates affect choices made by a
sample of Australian life insurance firms to voluntarily use AIS during 1992-93.
These results hold even after controlling for other economic incentives commonly
used by prior studies to explain intra-industry accounting policy choices in samples of
similar financial service firms.2
The paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the empirical
framework used to examine accounting policy choices by Australian life insurers. The
third section outlines the sample selection procedure, defines the variables and
describes the data. The fourth section reports the results. The final section presents the
conclusion.
Empirical Framework
6This section explains the theoretical background which motivates the study,
describes the institutional setting and develops a testable hypothesis.
Theoretical Background
 The information asymmetry is based on the assumption that, in equilibrium,
value-maximising firms have various levels of information asymmetry. When this
equilibrium is perturbed by the introduction of a new discretionary opportunity to
improve disclosure credibly, firms with greater information asymmetry should be
more likely to switch to the new, more informative accounting method (B&B, 400).
B&B (406) note that one problem with operationalizing the information
asymmetry perspective for non-insurance firms is that the degree of information
asymmetry among market participants is not directly observable. They utilise the
volume of shares traded in the firm as a variable linked to the degree of information
asymmetry, based on a review of theoretical models. However this variable is not an
appropriate empirical proxy for examining information asymmetries among market
participants related to Australian life insurance firms for two reasons. First, it does not
capture the reduction in information asymmetry among policyholders, the primary
providers of capital to mutual firms. Second, stock issued by most Australian life
insurance firms are not actively traded on the Australian stock exchange.3
  Another variable known to be associated with information asymmetries is a
firm’s current year tax liability as a percentage of reported earnings. Chaney and
Lewis (1995, 320) show that a manager of a high-value firm (i.e.: a firm that investors
expect has a high ability to generate economic earnings) over-reports income relative
to the first-best tax minimising reporting policy. Investors realise that only high-value
7firms are willing to pay the additional corporate taxes associated with over-reporting
to this level and value such firms accordingly. On the other hand, managers of low
value firms realise that the additional expected tax penalty from over-reporting
earnings exceeds the benefits of being identified as high-value firm and select the tax
minimising reporting policy (Chaney and Lewis, 321).Testing these implications
requires the identification of a new disclosure opportunity that could credibly reduce
information asymmetry among market participants.
Thus one empirically testable explanation for why a life insurance firm
manager may choose to voluntarily use an innovative new accounting technique (such
as AIS) is because it is a credible device to reduce the firm’s high level of information
asymmetry, by demonstrating to investors that the firm can generate economic
earnings (a ‘high-value’ firm), thus increasing investors’ ability to infer firm type from
reported earnings. In this study, AIS was chosen for the empirical tests because (i) it
was a considered to be an innovative method for reporting a firm’s economic
earnings; (ii) life insurance firms with higher information asymmetries faced greater
incentives to adopt AIS early as a signal of ‘high-value’ to investors; (iii) AIS is
available to both mutual and shareholder-owned life insurance firms.4
An Institutional Setting
 Prior to 1996, statutory financial reports sent to the Australian life insurance
regulator (the Insurance and Superannuation Commission, hereinafter ‘ISC’) for
solvency purposes were based on regulatory accounting standards (RAS).5 Australian
life insurance firms are exempted from Australian accounting standards. Until recently
there were no accounting standards equivalent to RAS for life insurance firms to
8report profitability to their shareholders. AIS were developed by the Australian
actuarial profession as being specifically appropriate for revealing ‘realistic’ profits to
shareholders, policyholders and other annual financial report users (Dunsford 1988).
This study examines the voluntary use of AIS by life insurance firms in the
earlier period 1992-93 because; (i) AIS reports profitability, which are not available
under RAS; (ii) AIS were regarded as being effectively non-switchable accounting
policy choices because they were endorsed as ‘best practice’ by the actuarial
profession and shortly thereafter were mandated by professional actuarial standards
issued in 1994;6 (iii) AIS were also developed in other Anglo-American countries at
this time;7 and (iv) after 1993, AIS use became more widespread following ongoing
consultation between Australian and New Zealand standard setters (Klumpes, 1995b).
Hypothesis Development
Life profit testing models demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, AIS-based life
insurance profits emerge earlier over the term of a simple life insurance policy than
RAS-based profits.8 This is because AIS allows the smoothing of income expected to
be earned over the life of a policy, by recognition of a planned margin (Institute of
Actuaries 1991). These ‘planned margins’ are not acceptable under either ordinary
Australian GAAP (Klumpes 1995b) or UK GAAP (O’Brien, 1995). However in the
joint exposure draft Australian and New Zealand professional accounting standard
setting bodies argued that the mandatory use of AIS would reduce the level of
information asymmetry faced by life insurance firms in reporting their profitability.
They claimed that AIS would improve the informativeness of the disclosure of the
long term profitability of an ‘industry entrusted with considerable economic resources,
9and upon which many individuals and groups depend on their continued operation’
(AASB ED 73, 39).
The theoretical literature reviewed earlier implies that firms voluntarily use
AIS in order to eliminate some of the information asymmetry among market
participants, policyholders and other users about their ability to generate economic
income. This could be corroborated by observed empirical evidence which shows that
AIS users report higher income tax rates than non users. The costs of using LIAS are
the additional information production costs associated with implementing AIS. These
costs are likely to be roughly uniform across firms.9 However since the benefits of
improved disclosure are increasing in the initial level of the information asymmetry, it
is hypothesised that life insurance firms with higher reported income tax rates are
more likely to voluntarily adopt AIS:
Australian life insurance firms with higher reported income tax rates are more
likely to use AIS.
Other Possible Determinants of AIS Choice
B&B (403) note that it is necessary to control for several variables when
investigating the incremental power of the information asymmetry perspective for
explaining cross-sectional variation in accounting choices. Previous research indicates
that firm size has proven to be a robust variable for explaining cross-sectional
accounting choice. One explanation is that large firms seek to choose accounting
practices that reduce the probability of large earnings in order to avoid possible
political attention (regulation and/or taxation). Based on this view, large firms should
10
choose to use AIS, as it reduces the volatility associated with profits reported over the
life of a life insurance contract and the expected costs associated with them.
The role of solvency in prior accounting choice research arises from its role as
a regulatory signal related to the violation of minimum net worth requirements (e.g.:
Blacconiere et al. 1991). Australian life insurers are required to maintain a surplus of
statutory fund assets in excess of their policy liabilities. Thus the probability of
regulatory intervention only arises where the statutory funds are in deficit, as was the
case for two insolvent life insurers, Regal and Occidental, in 1990. As intervention
can lead to closure, involuntary merger, management supervision or other restrictions
on operations as specified by the Life Insurance Act 1945 (Cth), managers are likely to
view the consequences of violating these capital requirements to be costly. Thus low
value life insurance firms that are closer to violating their minimum net worth
requirements are more likely to adopt a tax minimising policy and hence are less
likely to use an  innovative new method, i.e. AIS, in reporting their profitability to
shareholders.
Another control factor is ownership structure. Incentive conflicts between
policyholders and shareholders of Australian life insurance firms can be controlled
with alternative (share versus mutual) forms of ownership structure. Share-owned
companies have access to equity markets which provide sources of solvency that are
unavailable to mutuals (Blacconiere et al. 1991). Thus high value share-owned life
insurance firms are more likely to use AIS in order to distinguish their firm type to
market participants from low value share-owned firms than would high value mutual
firms.
A final control variable posited to be associated with accounting policy choice
by the Australian life insurance industry is the level of expenses incurred to operate a
11
life insurance business, relative to periodic total value of business (‘expense ratio’).
Brennan (1993) shows that it is equivalent to a ‘spread’ that banks, mutual funds and
insurance companies use to price their products. Evidence shows that the expense
ratio is endogenous with a life insurance firms’ investment and operating decisions.
Babbel and Staking (1983, 10) show that the expense ratio used in capital budgeting
by US life insurance firms over the thirty year period 1949-1979 is positively related
to the interest rate. Klumpes (1995a) finds that managers of 33 Australian life
insurance firms with relatively high expense ratios have a greater propensity to
voluntarily disclose accounting information in promotional brochures offering
investment-related contracts in 1990-91. In this study, it is posited that such firms are
also more likely to use AIS than other firms.
Sample Selection and Variable Definitions
Sample Selection
AIS first became available when the Australian Institute of Actuaries
developed Guidance Note 253 on the determination of policy liabilities in 1991. AIS
was later the subject of discussion papers issued both by the Australian Accounting
Research Foundation (1994) and the Accountants and Actuaries Liaison Committee
(1994). AIS was eventually published as a professional actuarial standard in June
1995, the same month in which the Australian government proposed the overhaul of
the Life Insurance Act, 1945 (Cth). Thus the sample covers the period 1992-93, when
12
the decision to use AIS was voluntary. Sample firms were selected from those
registered under the Act and were identified by a two step procedure. First, they must
have been in continuous existence over this study period. Second, they are not owned
by another Australian life insurance firm. This procedure yields a total of 42 firms.
Next, 7 life insurance firms were eliminated that specialise in reinsurance
activities. These firms specialise in transferring mortality risk and in some cases
investment income of direct life insurance firms. Adams (1996) provides evidence
that the propensity of New Zealand direct life insurance firms to use reinsurance
during 1988-1993 was associated with higher leverage and greater underwriting risk.
Thus reinsurance firms’ decision to use AIS may explained by factors other than
information asymmetry. Another 7 firms were eliminated which did not provide all
the data required for the tests below. The final sample contains 28 firms.
A life insurance firm is classified as a voluntary AIS user if it was used in the
first two years it became available (1992-93), i.e. in the two years prior to the issue of
the AARF (1994) discussion paper. Of the final sample of 28 firms, 13 (46 percent)
are voluntary AIS users. For each sample firm, annual data was obtained from (1)
statutory returns submitted to the ISC; and (2) reports issued to shareholders.
Variable Definitions
The taxation rate is available for both mutual and non-mutual Australian life
insurance firms in annual profit and loss account data submitted to the ISC (Form C,
First Schedule). Since taxes were calculated on a firms’ RAS-based taxable profit (or
loss) during the study period 1992-1995, it is not directly affected by a firm’s decision
to adopt AIS. It is denoted INFOASYM.
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The tests also involve empirical proxies for each of the control variables: firm
size, mutual status, expense ratio and solvency ratio. Firm size of the ith firm (LSIZEi)
is the natural logarithm of the total value of policy liabilities of all statutory funds
managed by the life insurance company, in $A millions. The solvency ratio (SRATIOi)
is the net surplus (deficit) of total assets over total policy liabilities of the statutory
funds, as calculated annually by the firm’s actuary and annually reported to the ISC
(Second Schedule). The expense ratio for Australian life insurance firms (EXPENSEi)
is published semi-annually by ISC (Table 11) and the ownership status of the life
insurance company was denoted by a dummy variable, where zero was assigned to a
mutual, and 1 to a shareholder-owned firm (MUTUALi).
Empirical Evidence
Univariate Tests
Results of univariate tests for my prediction based upon the information
asymmetry perspective, along with each of the control variables, are shown in table 1.
The differences in the means of the variables between the two groups of firms are in
the predicted direction. The mean of INFOASYM is significantly higher for AIS users,
4.402 versus 11.569. These results are supportive of the information asymmetry
perspective as a hypothesis for explaining accounting choices.
The results for the control variable LSIZE are also in agreement with the
predictions outlined above. AIS users are larger on average than non-users. The
former have a mean total policy liability of 7.562 (measured as the natural log of firm
size in millions of Australian dollars), whereas the latter have a mean value of 5.489.
AIS users are also to be less likely to violate minimum solvency requirements: their
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mean SRATIO of 2.514% significantly exceeds that of non-users (0.926%). Although
AIS users are also found to be more likely to be mutuals and have on average higher
expense ratios, these coefficients are not significantly different from those of non-
users. Overall, these results are comparable to those obtained by B&B (410).
-----------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
-----------------------------------------------
Multivariate Tests
Table 2 shows correlations among the variables and indicates that these are not
statistically significant between any of the explanatory variables.
-----------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
-----------------------------------------------
Table 3 presents the results of the multivariate logistic model used to
simultaneously test the hypothesis controlling for all other variables. The multivariate
results are fully supportive of the univariate results. In particular, the coefficient
estimate of the proxy for information asymmetry is positive and statistically
significant at the ten percent level. The coefficients on the control variables LSIZE and
SRATIO are also consistent with their univariate results.
-----------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
-----------------------------------------------
Sensitivity Tests
The information asymmetry hypothesis is corroborated by further evidence
which examines the change in expense ratio following the voluntary use of AIS, i.e. a
switch to a more informative accounting method (B&B, 414). If this switch reduces
information asymmetry, then the taxation rate should also be increased for AIS users.
Following B&B’s suggested procedure, this implication is tested by comparing the
15
change in taxation ratio in the year immediately following the first-time use of AIS
(i.e.: 1993-4). The change in annual tax ratio for the firm ( D TAX) is measured as the
taxation ratio (INFOASYM) of the ith firm in the year following the decision to use
AIS (year 1) minus the tax ratio in the year the decision was made (year 0), scaled by
the tax ratio in year 0. Table 4 shows that, as expected, the mean of D TAX for AIS
users is positive (3.031) and significant at the three percent level; the mean D TAX for
non-AIS users is negative (-125.978).  The mean difference is highly significant,
indicating that AIS user tax rates increased relative to non-users. Similar results hold
for the median D TAX.
-----------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
----------------------------------------------
Conclusion
The voluntary use of AIS is predicted to be explained by the information
asymmetry perspective, which suggests that firms use innovative accounting methods
in order to reduce the level of information asymmetry by capital market participants
and other financial report users. Chaney and Lewis (1995) suggest that, where report
users are unable to observe economic earnings from reported earnings, managers of
high value firms seek to reduce their level of information asymmetry by over-
reporting income relative to the first-best tax minimising policy.
This study developed tax rates as an empirical proxy for testing the
implications of the information asymmetry perspective in the context of the voluntary
use of AIS by Australian life insurance firms in 1992-93, when it first became
available. At this time, Australian life insurance firms considered AIS to be an
16
innovative accounting method because it required them to report their profitability on
an economic income basis for the first time, using a complex actuarial based present
value calculation. Results from both univariate and multivariate tests are fully
supportive of this information asymmetry perspective, even after controlling for other
variables used by prior empirical accounting research to explain voluntary accounting
choices by firm managers. These results are corroborated by sensitivity tests of
subsequent changes in tax rates reported by AIS users and non-users.
The robustness of these findings to alternative interpretations is restricted by
the choice of institutional setting, the reliance on tax rate as the appropriate proxy for
information asymmetry and the relatively small sample size.  Nevertheless, the results
suggest two implications for the information asymmetry perspective. First, the
findings demonstrate the robustness of the results derived by prior researchers (B&B)
in using the perspective to explain accounting policy choice in other settings. Second,
the findings appear to support the reliance on information asymmetry as a stated
rationale given by Australian and New Zealand accounting standard setting bodies for
issuing new AIS-based financial reporting standards for life insurance firms. Further
evidence is needed to examine whether life insurance firm managers face similar
incentives to voluntarily use AIS in other financial reporting environments, such as
the UK, where these techniques have recently become available.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Life insurers are of special interest here because (i) information is so asymmetric
between the participants and the institution, and the need for control and contractual
structures to permit them to function is so critical that they essentially define these
institutions (Ross 1989); (ii) they sell non-traded residual claims, most of which are
held by their policyholders rather than by shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983); (iii)
their assets and liabilities are mainly financial (Merton, 1988); and (iv) they deal with
long term contracts whose profitability is uncertain (Adams and Scott, 1994); (v) their
regulation is primarily capital adequacy rather than disclosure-based.
2. Prior studies have investigated the effects of various economic incentives  (eg: size,
ownership structure, violation of minimum net worth requirements) on managerial
behaviour of insurance-based institutions in (i) voluntary financial disclosures in
policy brochures issued by Australian life insurers promoting investment-related
contracts (Klumpes 1995a); (ii) the structure of balance sheets between New Zealand
mutual and stock insurance companies (Adams 1995); and (iii) the voluntary use of
regulatory accounting principles by managers of  US Savings and Loan Associations
(Blacconiere et al. 1991).
3. Of the 18 shareholder-owned life insurance firms included in the study sample, 8
are wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign life insurance companies and 5 are owned by
holding companies operating a wide range of other financial services (e.g.: banking).
4. In a mutual life insurance firm, the policyholders are also the owners of the firm
and are important for capital raising (Mayers and Smith, 1981, 1986). Analogous to
the arguments for shareholder-owned firms, improved disclosure by mutuals may be
expected to result in a higher demand for (profit-sharing) policies due to reduced
information asymmetry.
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5. RAS were promulgated by the ISC, in collaboration with the Australian life
industry (represented by the Life Insurance Federation) in 1986 (as Circular No. 241),
following concerns expressed by the then securities regulator, the National Companies
and Securities Commission, about apparent inconsistencies in financial reporting
practices between life insurers and other types of Australian companies.
6. The MOS method was recommended as ‘best practice’ by an Australian Institute of
Actuaries guideline in 1991, and later mandated as a ‘professional actuarial standard’
in 1995.
7. For more extensive reviews of accounting and financial reporting for life insurance
activities in Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA, see Adams and Scott (1994).
Fogarty and Grant (1995) review the role of the actuarial profession in US GAAP,
while Klumpes (1998) reviews various actuarial-developed methods developed for
UK life company reporting.
8. Life profit testing models examine the effect of alternative assumptions about profit
calculation, interest rates etc. on the pattern of profits emerging over the term of a
simple endowment policy (Adams and Scott, 1994). This result is corroborated by
anecdotal evidence from a prospectus issued by an Australian mutual firm proposing
de-mutualisation in 1994. The prospectus included both sets of profits on its life
insurance business during the period 1991-93 which revealed that AIS-based profits
were significantly higher over this period than its equivalent RAS-based earnings
figures (Klumpes, 1995b).
9. Relative to RAS, the costs of using AIS primarily relate to the additional actuarial
fees paid to value ‘best estimates’ of policy liabilities under MOS. As this actuarial
procedure utilises standard software technology which costs the same irrespective of
19
the number of policies issued by the firm, it is reasonable to assume that these costs
will be relatively uniform across firms.
20
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Pairwise correlations between independent variables
Variable      INFOASYM      MUTUAL              LSIZE          SRATIO            EXPENSE
(n=28):
INFOASYM   1.000                  -                -                  -      -
MUTUAL     0.251    1.000       -                     -                  -
LSIZE          0.224               0.342   1.000        -           -
SRATIO        -0.092              -0.073    -0.114              1.000                  -
EXPENSE         -0.012               -0.016   -0.052              0.352   1.000
                                    
Table Notes: INFOASYM is the tax rate of the ith firm. MUTUAL is a dummy variable
indicating whether a life insurance firm is a stock (=0) or a mutual (=1); LSIZE is the
natural logarithm of total policy liabilities of statutory funds managed by a life
insurance firm; SRATIO is the net surplus (deficit) of total assets over total policy
liabilities of the statutory funds; EXPENSE is the total expenses incurred in operating
the life insurance firm’s business. All variables are measured in the year of the
adoption. Tests of the hypotheses are two-sample t-tests, and reported significance




Logistic Model of Decision to Use AIS
Number of Observations = 28
Dependent Variable = 1, if AIS user (n = 13)
              = 0, if non-AIS user (n = 15)
                      Intercept    INFOASYM  MUTUAL    LSIZE     SRATIO       EXPENSE
Expected Sign      ? +         +       +          +     +     
Coefficient -39.412         0.166     5.255 3.824        3.881 0.235
Std Error (20.969)       (0.096)    (3.613)        (2.042)       (2.042)     (0.225)
Significance    0.060          0.081     0.148 0.061        0.075  0.297
(one-tailed)
Chi-squared statistic (H0: all model parameters (except the intercept) are zero): 29.321
(p=0.0001)
                                    
Table Notes: INFOASYM is the tax rate of the ith firm. MUTUAL is a dummy variable
indicating whether a life insurance firm is a stock (=0) or a mutual (=1); LSIZE is the
natural logarithm of total policy liabilities of statutory funds managed by a life
insurance firm; SRATIO is the net surplus (deficit) of total assets over total policy
liabilities of the statutory funds; EXPENSE is the total expenses incurred in operating
the life insurance firm’s business. All variables are measured in the year of the
adoption. Tests of the hypotheses are two-sample t-tests, and reported significance
levels are for one-tailed tests.
25
TABLE 4
Tests for Changes in Reported Taxation Rate Following AIS Use
      Mean             Median  
                                                N              D TAX                                D TAX
Life insurance firms 13         3.031                     1.601
using AIS in 1992-3
Life insurance firms 15    -125.978                  -64.012
not using AIS in 1992-3
p-values for two-samples tests of the null
hypothesis that          0.030 0.038
D TAX0 > D TAX1
                                                
Table Notes: The change in taxation rate for the ith firm [ D TAXi] is measured as the
taxation rate of the ith firm in the year following the selection of AIS minus the
taxation rate in the year the selection was first reported in the annual financial
statements (year 0), scaled by the taxation rate in year 0. N is the number of
observations.
